Although Africa-China relations began centuries ago, it was only after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC/China) in 1949 that Beijing frmly established its foothold on the continent, gradually displacing the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan) as Africa’s Chinese partner. Thereafter, Africa developed a multifaceted relationship with China, featuring not only diplomatic exchanges and trade but also developmental and military assistance, and collaboration in various international forums (Dever and Dever, 2020; Nyadera, Agwanda and Kisaka, 2021; Zoppi, 2020). Contemporary Africa-China relations fnd their underpinnings in the context of the 1989 crisis of Tiananmen Square, the demise of the Cold War, China’s rise as an economic power and its thirst for raw materials (Abegunrin and Manyeruke, 2020; Large, 2008; Matambo, 2020). Having grown rapidly in the past two decades, they are climaxed by expanding trade, Chinese aid and foreign direct investment (FDI), multilateral co-operation through the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) including ties with the African Union (AU) and other regional groupings such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as Chinese participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in Africa. They are also marked by a Chinese diplomatic assertiveness to create a positive image in Africa (Gill and Reilly, 2007; Kalu, 2020; Tsikata, Fenny and Aryeetey, 2010) and to exemplify the benefts of South-South co-operation (Brautigam, 2009; De Bruyn, 2020; Flint and Waddoups, 2021).
China is Africa’s most visible Global South partner having become the continent"s biggest economic and trading partner (Olorunfemi, 2021; Sun, Jayaram and Kassiri, 2017; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development— UNCTAD, 2020; World Bank, 2018). In SSA alone, there are over 2,200 Chinese enterprises (Pigato and Tang, 2015) and hundreds of thousands of Chinese migrants (China Africa Research Initiative, 2021; Tudoroiu, 2021). Broadly, Africa-China relations span across all scales—macro (governmental and regional/continental), meso (Chinese transnational corporations/state owned enterprises) and micro (Chinese entrepreneurial migration).
The existing scholarship examines the relationship in three broad categories. Two of them, the Sino-and Western-driven literature, which are the most entrenched, for the most part, remain ostensibly driven by the global competition between the old great powers in the West and the ‘new’ Asian giant, marked specifcally by Western anxieties about "losing Africa" to Beijing. They are also Sino-centric, focussing largely on what China does and wants in Africa, and whether this is good or bad, based on the tacit assumption that Africa is a ‘passive’ partner (e.g. Asongu and Ssozi, 2016; Fijałkowski, 2011; Liu, 2021). Thus, in estimating the extent of China’s infuence on the continent, they implicitly marginalise African voices or initiative in the relationship. More so, the Sino and Western steered Africa-China scholarship because of their approaches have largely presented Africa as a single uniform entity, mostly reactive to Beijing’s diplomatic initiatives (e.g., Hodzi, 2020a; Shen and Fan, 2014; Ziso, 2017) as they analyse or pay almost exclusive attention to the formal political-administrative structures of countries, ‘presumed conventionally as synonymous with states, and thus the foremost, if not only the arena for foreign policymaking’.
The effects of such unitary-and state-centrism are their failure to capture the complexities of identities, interests and interactions informing SSA states’ engagements with China. They also falsify the policymaking environment in Africa by ignoring the voices and infuences of non-state actors and their impact on foreign policy making towards China. Studies on Africa-China relations are also rarely comparative, with only a few investigating the relationship across different African countries (e.g., Cissé, 2013; Lampert and Mohan, 2014; Rapanyane and Sethole, 2020). In sum, the literature on Africa China relations ignores African discourses and domestic contests over China policies, lacking a comparative dimension. Consequently, several scholars of Africa-China relations (e.g., Alden, 2005; Amoah, 2016, 2019, 2021; Bodomo, 2010, 2012, 2018, 2020; Tull, 2006; Taylor, 1998, 2006, 2007) have called for the inclusion of the African perspective. Large (2008), for instance, asserts the need to move beyond the rhetoric of a powerful China engaging in an unfamiliar and uniform African terrain to include a more contextual analysis of these relations in their historical, geographical, and political complexity.
The calls to address these gaps have led to a third and relatively nascent category of the Africa-China scholarship, which is primarily African-focussed. Besides attempting to rectify the shortfalls of the two established categories, it emphasises, if not illuminates, the relationship also from the perspectives of African states as against those thrusted by Chinese and Western power struggle or interests. Yet, even within this fedgling scholarship, those that do recognise African agency, nonetheless predominantly focus on China’s effects on Africa (e.g., Hodzi, 2020b; Kragelund, 2014; Mason, 2017) reminiscent of some of the weaknesses of the Sino-centric approaches. They have also been critiqued by Mohan and Lampert (2013) for example for failing to move beyond the confnes of the state sector. The very few and recent studies within the bourgeoning and promising Africa-focussed category of the Africa China scholarship that depart from these paths as critiqued across all three categories have demonstrated the necessity for increased and expanded on the-ground research (feldwork) on the African side and an assessment of the infuence of non-state actors on foreign policymaking.
Generally, given the limitations of the Sino and state-centric approaches, the Africa-China literature is yet to explore the complex domestic environment of African foreign policy making towards China. This book therefore addresses the Sino-centric and state-centric bias in the existing literature on Africa-China relations. Furthermore, by identifying how actors within and beyond the offcial political-administrative realms of the state construct and contest domestically, it contributes to the broader Constructivist theorising on state identity. In doing so, it does not only address the largely ignored African discourses and domestic contests over China policies but also with a comparative dimension across two cases. Paying a more sustained attention to the African agency andb discourses, it explores African domestic constructions of China and their implications for the nature of Africa’s relationship with China. With its primary goal of contributing to Africa-centric scholarship on Africa-China relations, the study dissects the intra-African debates about China, thereby departing from the conventional unitary actor and rational choice approaches that dominate the current scholarship.
More specifcally, this book will evaluate the constructions of China across macro, meso and micro scales of SSA societies. It will also examine the complex interactions between state and non-state actors in informing SSA understandings of and policies on China. Yet, in assessing African domestic constructions of China, the study will refect on the discursive contexts that include Chinese and Western infuences. In doing so, it ponders over the degree of similarity between African constructions of China and the perspectives advanced by Western and Chinese actors. Finally, the book will deploy a theoretical framework—constructivism-at-home—in its appraisal of African narratives on China and thus offering a constructivist perspective on Africa China relations. Its domestic agent-centred constructivist framework enables an identifcation of the plurality of agents who contest and construct spe cifc notions of Chinese engagement with Africa, impacting the Africa-China relationship.
The book’s contributions are not only empirical. Formulating an International Relations (IR) Constructivist framework that facilitates an analysis of how a state’s domestic constructions of external others affect its interactions and policies towards them, the study does not only expand the theoretical prowess of constructivism as against rationalist approaches and previous constructivist studies but also cases where the constructivist approach has offered comprehensive insight through its novel application to an Africa-China study. In offering an IR constructivist perspective on Africa-China relations, the book designs a ‘novel’ methodology for constructivist analysis, which could beneft subsequent studies in International Relations.
To appraise the African China-related narratives, it draws on two countries, namely, Ghana and Kenya as representative of the sub-Saharan Africa region while tapping into multiple sets of data, including print/online news publications by the most popular dailies as well as news websites. Furthermore, feldwork in Ghana and Kenya yielded important primary resources including interviews with the representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), journalists, academics, policymakers and civil servants (see List of Interviewees). The last but one section of the chapter justifes the selection of both Ghana and Kenya as case studies to explore sub-Saharan African constructions of China.
Overall, this book, building upon conventional constructivism, argues that the economic aspects of sub-Saharan states’ relations with China have neither positive nor negative meanings on their own. Rather, diverse SSA agents— both state and non-state—compete over the meanings of the China relationship, seeking to infuence foreign policy making. As the study will demonstrate, Ghana’s and Kenya’s domestic constructions of China to a large extent echo the existing scholarly debates on China’s engagement with Africa, considering China as either an opportunity or a threat. Some African observers—just like those scholars eschewing straightforward conclusions—avoid a bimodal thinking, considering Chinese activities in Africa as too multifarious to be neatly labelled as ‘friendly’ or ‘threatening’. Collectively, they refect not only on the specifc objectives driving both countries’ policies towards China but also on the broader theme of China as an emerging power in Africa and beyond.
The study fnds that African elected offcials engage in constructing a pro China perspective, presenting Beijing’s economic assistance as exemplifying China’s benevolent nature, respectful of African states’ sovereignty and committed to helping Africa develop economically. Once out of offce, however, they join the chorus of China critics, who express their concerns about the negative aspects of economic relations with China, such as debt trap, environmental degradation and even interference in African states’ electoral politics. Such contrasting narratives—while suggesting the transactional nature of the Africa-China relationship—participate in defning for African foreign policy makers the boundaries of (im)possible and (un)intelligible action vis-à vis China, charting a variety of possible diplomatic strategies. By mapping the contours of African policymaking, they shape the interests of African states in China engagements. They also refect domestic debates about the objectives of and specifc programs for political and socio-economic development as African countries seek to leverage their natural resources in harnessing the fnancial assistance of great powers while remaining aware of the great power competition for infuence over Africa.