A substantial portion of the Africa-China literature maps out the history of the relationship as beginning with the PRC’s establishment in 1949, through to the 1990s, and prior to the 21st century phase of elevated engagements. The PRC’s establishment coincided with Africa’s frst wave of independence struggles. As China did not feature among the powers that colonised Africa, its leadership developed a narrative of common struggle against Western imperialism (Muekalia, 2004; Strauss, 2009; Verhoeven, 2020). For the Mao Ze dong regime, newly independent African states appeared as natural allies in its quest to gain international recognition (Gao, 1984; Siu and McGovern, 2017; Zhao, 2014). Beijing’s ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’—(1) national sovereignty, (2) win-win co-operation, (3) mutual non-aggression and non-alignment, (4) neutrality and non-interference in internal affairs, and (5) equality—constituted the bedrock for this mission (Ayoola, 2021; Strauss, 2009; Taylor, 1998).
The Chinese leadership made concerted frst contact with African states soon after the Korean War. It accelerated this after the 1955 Bandung Conference with Egypt as the frst to recognise the PRC in 1956. Morocco, Algeria, Sudan and Guinea followed between 1958 and1959. At the time, Beijing built upon its anti-colonial reputation, projecting itself as a model of successful revolutionary struggle to self-rule (Vines, 2007; Ye, 2021; Yu, 1965). Following the Sino-Soviet rift, China’s policy towards Africa radicalised, and featured diplomatic and military assistance to Maoist liberation groups (Hoffman, 2021; Muekalia, 2004). At the same time, Beijing competed with Taipei for diplomatic recognition from African states to be the sole legitimate government of China (Jin, 2015; Lin, 2007; Lisimba, 2020b).
Throughout the 1960s, China deployed formal and informal foreign policy instruments. Formal instruments included friendship treaties, cultural pacts, commercial relations and fnancial and technical assistance. Such instruments proved benefcial to the PRC as 14 new SSA states chose to recognise the PRC, rather than the ROC, as ‘China’ between 1960 and 1965. Informal policy instruments ranged from explicit to covert activities (Yu, 1965), chief among the latter being Beijing’s support for various African liberation movements. However, these proved counterproductive as they increased security concerns among some African governments that feared being overthrown. Consequently, by the late 1960s, Africa-China formal relations suffered as Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Madagascar, Senegal and Kenya expelled PRC diplomats, while Ghana, Tunisia, Burundi and the Central African Republic cut diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic (Alden and Alves, 2008).
The Mao regime’s rapprochement with the United States in the early 1970s—partly driven by its concerns about Soviet social imperialism—put an end to Beijing’s revolutionary activism in Africa. Throughout the 1970s, China’s foreign policy tactics had transformed from overt support to revolu tionary movements (except for South Africa) to the return of mundane diplomatic dialogue that helped Beijing regain support from African regimes (Eisenman, 2018; Tu, 2008). When in 1971, the UN General Assembly debates the Albanian resolution on the question of Chinese representation, 34 percent of support for replacement of the ROC with the PRC came from African member-states. As a result, African votes became crucial to Beijing’s diplomatic success in ousting the ROC from the UN (Verhoeven, 2020; Vines, 2007). Between 1970 and 1976, Beijing gained diplomatic recognition of 20 African states, bringing the total to 39. The Mao regime continued to provide economic assistance to selected African states. However, the levels of its lar gesse could not match those offered by the United States or the Soviet Union (Alden and Alves, 2008; Zhao, 2014).
When Deng Xiaoping replaced Mao Zedong as China’s paramount leader in the late 1970s, his foreign policy centred on establishing co-operative relations with the Western powers (seen as crucial to China’s economic moderni sation needs), while his domestic policies featured an ambitious programme of economic restructuring from a planned to a semi-market economy. In the context of these two priorities, Africa lost much of its geopolitical significance. For this reason, China’s economic assistance to African states dwindled throughout the 1980s (Lisimba, 2020b; Shinn, 2019; Tu, 2008). It was only with the end of the Cold War, which coincided with China’s diplomatic isolation due to the Tiananmen massacre that PRC foreign policy makers are considered the geopolitical signifcance of Africa. Shortly after June 1989, Beijing relaunched a diplomatic offensive in Africa (Hodzi, 2019; Muekalia, 2004; Taylor, 1998).
Relations with Africa (and the Third World more generally) provided China an opportunity to avert diplomatic isolation imposed by the West. This is when Beijing sent numerous high-level offcial visits, invited African leaders, increased aid to Africa and presented itself as a champion of the Third World countries in international organisations. African leaders welcomed China’s renewed interest as their Western partners seemingly lost interest in the continent. At the same time, they found relations with China useful as a counter balance to the Western demands for democratic reforms (Shinn, 2019; Taylor, 2007; Vines, 2007). During the early post-Cold War era, Africa-China relations featured high-level Chinese visits (particularly between 1996 and 1997), the establishment of FOCAC in 2000, proclamation of Chinese ‘White Papers’ on Africa (starting in 2006), and the establishment of the China-Africa Development Fund in 2007.
Furthermore, having grown at double digits for over two decades, trade became a centrepiece of China’s Africa relations, as the naturally resource-rich Africa states were to be crucial for the resource hungry Chinese export-producing industries (Besada and O’Bright, 2017; Ye, 2021). The above overview of the historical literature reveals a predominantly Sino-centric focus. Largely, it depicts Africa and its leaders as passive, who merely react to Beijing’s strategies. For the few studies which discuss African agency (e.g., Mason, 2017), they note the centrality of Chinese efforts in isolating Taiwan as enabling African governments’ agency in a play-off between China and Taiwan. Thereby, African states’ capacity to beneft from the China Taiwan confict appears as a by-product of Chinese interests. Only few studies have focussed on African initiative, agency or voice in China encounters. Additionally, such Africa-centric studies mostly revolve around state elites and institutions, neglecting non-state elites. This renders the literature on Africa China relations substantially state-centric. Such a unitary approach marginalises the complexity of policy making within African states, which features a multitude of actors—both state and non-state—all competing over diplomatic strategies towards China and elsewhere. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, the existing historical analyses provide signifcant empirical evidence as a good background for this book.