The contemporary scholarship has begun addressing the shortcomings of the historical literature but is still saddled predominantly with a relatively ‘silent treatment’, if not negligence of Africa’s agency in the China relationship. Except a few (e.g., Bodomo, 2012; Matambo, 2021; Mthembu and Mabera, 2021; Otele, 2020), the literature has focussed primarily on what China does in Africa, paying signifcant attention to Western concerns about Africa-China encounters and contrasting them with Beijing’s perspectives. A classic example is Alden’s (2007) categorisation of extant analysis of Bei jing’s relationship with Africa into three lenses of China as a development partner, economic competitor or coloniser, which pays predominant attention to what China does and wants in Africa. Alden (2007), like many others, neglects an Afro-centric perspective which must focus on and theorise what Africans make of their relationship with the PRC. Similarly, Gros and Fung (2019), despite departing from the literature’s predominant rationalist (realism/liberalism) approach—and thus adopting a constructivist perspective— focus on China’s constructions of its identities—predominantly by state elites—and attendant impact on its policies towards Africa. By doing so, the criticisms noted in the historical literature permeate largely throughout the contemporary scholarship too. In the contemporary literature, the Western rivalry comes into sharp focus as studies try largely to characterise either the West or China as good or bad for the continent, resulting in images of China that are spread across three broad themes that resonate with the current scholarship on Africa-China relations: economic (including trade, FDI and aid); formal diplomatic (including state-to-state relations, peacekeeping, Beijing’s non-interference foreign policy) and public diplomacy (including Confucius Institutes). Inherent within each theme is a comparison of China’s relations with Africa to Western powers’ engagement with the continent, which often leads to explicit or implicit evaluations of the extent to which China relations beneft Africa. Resulting analyses paint three images: (a) Negative—critical of China; (b) Positive—pro-China; and (c) Nuanced— neither pro-nor anti-China (also see Table 1.1).
Analyses critical of China often present the PRC as seeking African resources while supporting African dictators (da Cruz, 2017; Halper, 2010; Harchaoui, Maseland and Watkinson, 2021). They argue Beijing confers international legitimacy on African leaders with poor governance and human right records, in exchange for which, it obtains their support in blocking UN resolutions seeking to criticise China on human right issues (Mason, 2017). Some studies go as far as denouncing China as a (neo)colonialist, whose non-conditionality and non-interference policies impede efforts to promote human rights and democracy across Africa (Antwi-Boateng, 2017; el-Shafei and Metawe, 2021; Gravett, 2020). Academic research, which is critical of China’s engagement with Africa, identifes specifc issues of concern, which are discussed below. Generally, these concerns pertain to the negative impacts of China on Africa, rather than the adverse effects Africa has on the PRC, if any (see Part A of Table 1.1).
One of these issues is the question of China’s role in deindustrialising SSA. SSA economies export raw materials to the PRC and import fnished Chinese products (Ademola, Bankole and Adewuyi, 2009; Geda, Mosisa and Assefa, 2013; Johnston, Morgan and Wang, 2015), but face Chinese competition in third markets. Therefore, African manufacturers fnd it diffcult to compete in domestic and foreign markets, which often results in their bankruptcies and the subsequent deindustrialisation of the region (Giovannetti and Sanflippo, 2016; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2006, 2008, 2009; Zafar, 2007). The centrality of commodity exports in Africa-China trade (particularly oil exports) may also trigger the so-called ‘resource curse or Dutch disease’ in resource-rich SSA countries by impeding economic diversifcation (Kalu and Aniche, 2020; Martuscelli, 2020; Taylor, 2006), which poses challenges to good governance and macro-economic management in SSA (Geda et al., 2013; Rapanyane, 2021; Zafar, 2007).
A signifcant portion of the literature critical of China examines the role of resources in China’s relations with the continent (Geary and Nyiawung, 2021; Gould, 2021; Lisimba, 2020a). While noting the complementary nature of China-African economic relations (China securing resources and in re turn providing capital for infrastructure development) (Arewa, 2016; Marson, Maggi and Scacchi, 2021; Zhang, 2021), several studies argue that the extent of Beijing’s economic assistance depends on particular African economies’ resource wealth: that is, those SSA countries with more natural resources tend to receive more Chinese aid and investment (Abekah-Koomson and Chin weokwu, 2020; Fuchs and Rudyak, 2019; Liu and Deseatnicov, 2016). Thus, Chinese aid is less altruistic and development oriented, serving only government elites’ interests and not ordinary African citizens. This is why Chinese investments and trade might inhibit SSA economic development (Brazys and Vadlamannati, 2020; Cha, 2020; Naim, 2007). While harming the macro economic development of SSA, Chinese aid/loans increase the levels of African debt, leading to the ‘debt trap’ (Carmody, 2020; Kilama, 2016), which could potentially undermine SSA macro-economic management (Addis et al., 2020; Ullman, 2019; van Rheenen, 2021).
Others criticise Beijing for supporting repressive SSA regimes (Ahere, 2020; Li, 2017; Shen and Fan, 2014), citing its weapons supply to Sudan for example as detrimental, due to its potential destabilising effects on African states, which often lack effcient controls over weapons distribution. Coupled with its casual attitudes toward accountability, democracy and environmental management, Beijing’s African encounters have sabotaged African attempts to enhance transparency in line with the New Partnership for African Development, which the Western powers supported. Effectively, it legitimises non democratic practices and human right violations under the guise of respect for sovereignty (Taylor, 2006; Zafar, 2007).
Furthermore, unlike Western companies, China and Chinese frms often engage in opaque dealings (including bribing local offcials), which facilitate corruption in SSA. Whereas Western governments institute measures to enhance transparency, Beijing appears less ready to sanction corrupt practices associ ated with its aid or investment projects (Kinyondo, 2019; Matingwina, 2020; Meservey, 2018). Critics also examine China’s dominance in the infrastructure sector (often linked with Beijing’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ [BRI]), which makes it diffcult for local construction companies to secure infrastructure contracts, especially in East Africa (Demissie, 2018; Wethal, 2019; Zajontz, 2021). Besides, the Chinese multinationals employ limited African labour. More so, they together with their Chinese labour, repatriate revenues and earnings from activities in Africa back to China. This means that there is less spin-off in benefts from the China relationship to the African economy and workforce (Kelley, 2011; Osabutey and Jackson, 2019). Also, the few local workers recruited by Chinese companies are often mistreated and paid low salaries (Bhebhe, Ga briel and Prince, 2020; Chipaike and Marufu, 2020; Stanislous, 2020).
Alongside studies critical of the PRC, others present a ‘brighter-tale’, which echoes Beijing’s offcial African narrative. They argue that Africa-China relations are not ‘new’ and continue to be guided by the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. In their view, Beijing’s earlier engagement with Africa was highly positive as China supported Africa’s anti-colonial struggles and funded its critical infrastructure epitomising nationhood. Beijing’s evolving Africa policies—ranging from ideological solidarity to economic pragmatism— remain steadfast because the guiding principles of equality, mutual beneft and respect for sovereignty underpin them (Hwang and Black, 2020; Lau, 2020; Lin, 2007). Some analysts directly challenge the negative (Western) assessments of China’s relations with Africa. Sautman and Yan (2007), for example, consider China as a better African partner because of the form of Chinese foreign aid, migration policies, investments, infrastructure loans and the Beijing Consensus. This is akin to Chinese foreign policy elites’ championing of African interactions as superior to self-serving Western strategies towards Africa (Addis and Zuping, 2018; Sautman and Yan, 2007; Song, Lee and Huang, 2019). Characteristically, the positive images as summarised in detail below (see also Part B of Table 1.1) refect benefts for both Africa and China, unlike the unidirectional negative images (compare Parts A and B of Table 1.1).
Specifcally, pro-China narratives focus on the Chinese demand for natural resources as indirectly increasing global commodity prices, thus benefting resource-rich SSA economies (Diawara and Hanson, 2019; Mohan, 2016). Additionally, increased exports of cheap Chinese products to SSA increase the purchasing power of African consumers as comparable Western goods are relatively unaffordable (Fioratta, 2019; Renard, 2011). Compared to Western conditional aid and unwillingness to transfer technologies, Chinese untied aid with technology transfers—though inferior to Western technology—beneft ordinary Africans (Hongrong, Xiaolu and Meibo, 2021; Landry and Chen, 2021; Mgendi, Shiping and Xiang, 2019). In return, raw materials imported from SSA meet China’s manufacturing needs. Finally, China accesses SSA as a ‘new market’ for its merchandise, creating opportunities for increased production and revenues (Agbebi and Virtanen, 2017; Konings, 2007; Rahal, 2017).
Beijing often bundles its import of African resources with grants and loans to fund infrastructure in SSA (Colley and Hai, 2021; Gu and Carey, 2019; Huang and Hu, 2020). This practice constitutes a centrepiece of the BRI, launched in 2013, which largely defnes China’s foreign policy towards Africa (Chan and Song, 2020; Deng, 2021; Phillips, 2017). Spanning Asia, Europe, East Africa, and the Pacifc, the BRI covers about 75, 40 and 65 percent of the world’s energy resources, gross domestic product (GDP) and population, respectively. In the African context, it is a vehicle for China’s efforts to facilitate trade, investment and infrastructure development across the continent. In East Africa, BRI projects include the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway, Addis Ababa metro rail system and expansion of its airport, as well as Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway (Appiah, 2015; Campbell, 2017; Griffths, 2017; Xinhua, 2017). The BRI offers an opportunity to African states to attune and harness the ‘Agenda2063’ development strategy, develop their infrastructure and industrialise, while providing Chinese frms an opportunity to expand their markets and returns (Ehizuelen, 2017; Gummi et al., 2020; Lammich, 2021).
More so, China’s activism in Africa (and beyond) has placed competitive pressures on the international aid regime, benefting African countries (Dicken, 2011; Greenhill, Prizzon and Rogerson, 2013; Gulrajani and Faure, 2019). This is especially so given the decline in the infrastructure component of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) aid from an average of 29.5 percent between 1973 and 1990 to 10 percent since 2000. Seeking new sources to fund infrastructure, African countries welcomed ‘new/increased’ Chinese aid (Dunford, 2020; Roussel, 2013; Sato et al., 2011). Chinese aid has also increased African bargaining power, agency and development space, allowing African governments to negotiate more effectively with the Western donors (Quadir, 2013; Tan‐Mullins, Mohan and Power, 2010; Thiombiano and Zhang, 2020).
Other studies also note the growth of China’s humanitarian assistance and contribution to African peacekeeping operations. Of all UN Security Council member-states, China provides the largest number of peacekeepers (UN Peacekeeping, 2018) to African operations. At the same time, it is also the second largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget after the US (Blasko, 2016; Fung, 2016; KFC, 2017). While China’s humanitarian assistance pales in comparison to that of the United States (Fan, 2013), it is steadily increasing, occasionally reaching as much as $200 million as was the case of Chinese relief aid to SSA during the Ebola crisis (Hornby and Donnan, 2014). China also conducts health diplomacy on a regular basis, dispatching medical teams to various African countries (Lin et al., 2016; Shen and Fan, 2014; Youde, 2010). After the frst such dispatch to Algeria in 1963, by 2016, China sent 20,000 medical doctors to 50 African countries, treating 210 million patients. Other forms of Chinese humanitarian assistance to Africa include building hospitals, training of healthcare professionals, provision of medical supplies (more recently this has included Sinopharm Covid-19 vaccines) and disease control and prevention programmes (Ding, Chai and Chen, 2020; Lee, 2021; Qiu, 2020).
The third category of the Africa-China contemporary academic discourse identifes both the positive and negative aspects, taking a relatively neutral stance on China’s engagement with Africa (see Part C of Table 1.1). It also demonstrates that China’s relations with Africa are so complex that any straightforward conclusions—praising or critical of China—are diffcult to arrive at, if at all possible. These nuanced images, rather than passing sweeping binary judgments, characteristic of the Negative and Positive images (compare Parts A, B and C of Table 1.1), dissect subtle facets of the Africa-China ties that provoke a rethinking of the relationship as strictly good or bad. In the process, they question some of the preceding popular images associated with China in Africa.
First, numerous scholars, for example, dismiss the characterisation of China as a reckless aid donor as an unfounded hearsay. Dreher et al. (2018), for instance, dispute claims that Chinese aid supports autocratic and corrupt African regimes, fnding no statistically signifcant correlation. Similarly, Bader (2015), upon assessing China’s 1993–2008 bilateral engagements, observes that Chinese economic co-operation projects, state visits and arms sales make no difference to the longevity of autocratic regimes, arguing that China’s role in sustaining autocratic states is exaggerated. Besada and O’Bright (2017) and Lopes (2016), for their part, dispute the argument regarding Beijing’s interest in Africa as driven by resources. They argue, instead, that China’s engagement with the region reflects its growing relevance as a global power in a way similar to the drivers motivating Western engagement with Africa.
Some studies discuss political stability/risk in attracting Chinese FDI to SSA. Chen, Dollar and Tang (2015) argue that Chinese FDI is uncorrelated to host states’ rule of law, whereas Western investors prefer recipient countries with better governance structures. However, as a share of FDI in host countries, Chinese investments are higher in countries with poor governance structures. Dreher and Fuchs (2015) also found no signifcant association between Chinese aid and host countries’ natural resources. Further, though Chinese FDI is relatively higher in labour-intensive sectors, it is biased towards capital-intensive sectors in capital-scarce countries. These trends are mostly observable in politically unstable countries correlating with the perception that Chinese frms might seek rent in riskier environments (Chen, Dollar and Tang, 2015) and as agreed by Buckley et al. (2007). Cheung et al. (2012) and Chen, Dollar and Tang (2015), in turn, found that political stability—and not risk—is positively associated with Chinese FDI to Africa.
Others note that Beijing delivers more foreign aid to sub-Saharan countries, which the Western donors allegedly avoid due to these countries’ corruption, governance structures and human rights concerns. Beijing also allocates development assistance to sectors—including infrastructure and energy—which DAC donors ignore (De Grauwe, Houssa and Piccillo, 2012; De Renzio and Seifert, 2014). Considering China as having become a major alternative donor, scholars debate its impacts on the traditional donors’ bargaining power. On the one hand, ‘new Chinese aid’ may challenge the power of DAC donors, including their capacity to impose political and economic conditionalities (Harman and Williams, 2014; Kragelund, 2011, 2014; McQuinn, 2019; Six, 2009). Hernandez (2017), for example, demonstrates that the World Bank delivers aid with less conditionality to African countries that receive Chinese assistance, marked by 15 percent less conditionality for every percentage increase in Chinese aid. Kilama (2016) also found that between 2000 and 2011, G7 donors deployed bilateral aid to offset China’s African infuence by delivering more aid to those African countries that are rich in natural resources or geopolitically signifcant.
On the other hand, some caution against overstating China’s impact on the international aid architecture and Western donors’ infuence. Instead, they ar gue that Chinese foreign aid complements Western developmental assistance, rather than representing an alternative aid model (ECOSOC, 2008; Swedlund, 2017). Gülseven (2020) goes as far as claiming that Chinese foreign aid fulfls the goals of the neo-liberal alliance. While Chinese aid focusses mainly on business interests abroad and Western aid remains a key source of income for Africa, numerous African governments—when forced to choose between the two—opt for Chinese aid because they believe it fows relatively quicker with less bureaucratic rules. Further, as the aid component of an African economy reduces, the infuence of traditional western donors shrinks correspondingly. Given China’s objectives to secure access to natural resources and foreign markets, Beijing is likely to be more active in those countries with declining aid dependency ratio. Hence, Chinese aid may suggest—even if it does not necessarily cause—Western donors’ waning negotiating power (Swedlund, 2017).
Finally, students of Chinese foreign policy conventionally consider Confucius Institutes as a major instrument through which Beijing deploys China’s soft power. Established in 2004 by the Offce of Chinese Language Council International, ostensibly to promote China’s language, culture and friend ships globally, it superfcially resembles the British Council or the Alliances Frances (Lien, Oh and Selmier, 2012). A number of studies have examined the roles Confucius Institutes play in China’s relations with Africa. Both Lien et al. (2012) and Xu, Yao and Zhang (2015), for example, found that the establishment of Confucius Institutes facilitated Chinese FDI and exports to host countries, particularly in SSA. Akhtaruzzaman, Berg and Lien (2017), in turn, found no association between Chinese foreign aid and Confucius Institutes in SSA, arguing that there are many objectives driving the establishment of Institutes, rather than the single motivation of securing natural resources.
From the above positive, negative and nuanced images as summarised in Table 1.1, the criticism of Sino-centrism in the historical literature as noted earlier is equally pronounced in the contemporary literature. In discussing the positives, negatives and even nuanced impacts of the Africa-China relationship, the effects China is having on Africa abound and take predominance over the African agency and/or effects in the China relationship. The observed Sino-centrism often goes in tandem with ‘state-centrism’ as similarly observed by Alden and Hughes (2009: 14) who criticise most studies for tending to presume the state (most often Beijing) as the primary unit of analysis when studying the Africa-China relationship. Adding to this critique, this book makes the case that African states are also not unitary entities. As mentioned earlier, both state-and Sino-centrism underestimate the complexity of Africa’s relations with the PRC to the extent of oversimplifying the policy making environment, if not misrepresenting it altogether. It is in attempts to rectify this shortfall/gap that the Africa-focussed studies are of great importance to the whole scholarship on Africa-China relations. The Africa-centric branch, which this book forms a part of, throws attention to the question of the ‘Africanness’ in the relationship with China.