Given the centrality of trade in multifaceted Africa-China engagements, it comes as no surprise that the size of trade often suggests which countries in Africa are Beijing’s preferred partners. Generally speaking, countries north and south of the Sahara differ in terms of their trading relations with China. Those south of the Sahara maintain more robust trade relations with China than those located north of the Sahara, which are more economically integrated with Europe. Moreover, the southern Sahara countries are the major recipients of China’s Africa FDI. At the same time, Chinese exports’ displacement effects are more pronounced in SSA (Giovannetti and Sanflippo, 2016; Jacobs, 2012; Stein and Uddhammar, 2021) than Northern Africa. The examination of sub-Saharan countries, therefore, is crucial to understanding the complexity of African attitudes towards China. Thus far, South Africa (e.g., Alden and Wu, 2021; Maphaka, 2020; Tshedza and Yende, 2021), Angola (e.g., Jureńczyk, 2020; Schmitz, 2021), Zambia (e.g., Matambo, 2021; Matambo and Onwuegbuchulam, 2021; Rapanyane, 2020) and Ethiopia (e.g., Bilate and Zou, 2021; Ziso, 2017) have received signifcant academic attention, compared to other sub-Saharan countries. Seeking to contribute to narrowing the gap, this study examines Ghana (located in Western Africa) and Kenya (located in Eastern Africa) as two case studies representative of SSA. By contrasting Ghana with Kenya, it also contributes to the comparative turn in the Africa-China scholarship.