In many respects, South Africa and Zimbabwe are also faring badly in climate action for social and climate justice. Similar to other countries in the region, both view and approach climate mitigation, adaptation and resilience building as a human development priority in policy terms. In so doing, Zimbabwe’s environmental laws that include the Constitution (2013), Forest Act (1949, as amended), Natural Resources Act (1941, as amended), Forest Act (1949, as amended), Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act (1971, as amended), Communal Lands Act (1982, as amended), Civil Protection Act (1989, as amended) and the Environmental Management Act (2002, as amended) articulate its legal position on a range of environmental matters; some of which have a direct and indirect bearing on the climate ecosystem. These laws fnd environmental and climate governance expression in the National Development Strategy 1, Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Framework, National Drought Plan for Zimbabwe, Disaster Risk Management Policy and Strategy, Water Policy, Forestry Policy, National Energy Policy and the Renewable Energy Policy (Brazier 2017). The National Climate Policy (2016) and National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) (2015) are the two climate policy and strategy documents that primarily inform the national climate action agenda. Broadly, the National Climate Policy (2016) seeks to guide climate change management, climate research modelling, scale up mitigation actions, enhance national adaptive capacity, transitioning to low-carbon development, clean technology transfer and information sharing, climate education, training and awareness (Government of Zimbabwe 2016). The overarching aim of the policy is to create a pathway towards climate-resilient development and a low-carbon economy (Zhakata 2019). However, it is not alive to the discourse and actions towards climate justice and a just transition. This policy failure to capture and project how the country imagines achievement of climate justice explains why even its successive NDCs have shortcomings in relation to how the lives and livelihoods of the poor and marginalized will be improved as the country transitions to low-carbon climate-resilient development. Further, although the NDCs outline several clean energy initiatives as a way of combating GHG emissions, this remains ambitious because they do not clearly show how these will be fnanced – which is at the core of climate justice.
The operationalization and implementation of Zimbabwe’s National Climate Policy is through the NCCRS which mainstreams mitigation and adaptation activities in economic, environmental and social development at national and sectoral levels through multi-stakeholder engagement. Although one can decipher social and climate justice thinking in the shaping of the NCCRS’ adaptation pillars that focus on minimizing the socioeconomic impacts of climate change, it is, how ever, diffcult to make a defnitive conclusion about their real impact on the lives and livelihoods of the poor and marginalized at the forefront of the climate crisis. Overall, while it is evident that Zimbabwe has made signifcant progress in developing comprehensive policies on the climate ecosystem, many of its targets and commitments are more aspirational than practical. The country’s protracted socioeconomic crisis means it simply doesn’t have the fnancial resources to fund and implement sustainable mitigation and adaptation interventions. It therefore re lies on the benevolence of international donors, specifcally from the North, who have the luxury to pick and choose which project-oriented interventions to fnance, for how much and for how long depending on their geostrategic interests of the time. This reliance on project climate fnance adds another layer of unpredictability and vulnerability for the poor and marginalized, thus perpetuating their climate injustice. Hence, although Zimbabwe has a robust policy and strategic framework to address the challenges posed by the climate crisis, it remains uncontested that it is miles away from meaningfully addressing climate injustice.
Zimbabwe’s climate action failures are surpassed by continental powerhouse South Africa which is the biggest GHG emitter in the region. Its climate governance system is legally built on the national Constitution specifcally Chapter 2, Section 24 (on environmental rights, conservation and protection), and supporting laws that include, among others, the National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act of 2004, Disaster Management Amendment Act of 2002, National Energy Act of 2008, National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act of 2008 and the Carbon Tax Act of 2019. As part of this climate governance continuum, a number of macro policies, strategies and action plans inform the national, provincial and local governments in their climate planning and programming. These include the NCCRS (2004), Long-Term Mitigation Strategy Scenarios (2008), National Climate Change Response White Paper (2011), National Development Plan 2030 (2012), National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (2019), Green Transport Strategy (2018), Integrated Resource Plan (2019), Low-Emission Development Strategy (2020) and the Just Transition Framework (2022).
However, even though South Africa has ambitious mitigation policy and strategies, it is failing to spearhead achievement of GHG emission reduction targets in the region and to meet objectives enunciated in its NDCs under the Paris Agreement. Its absolute GHG emissions remain very high without signifcant progress towards reduction. One of the reasons that explains this is the country’s continued reliance on coal-generated electricity through the national energy parastatal Eskom. Despite its declining electricity generation capacity due to dilapidated infrastructure and mismanagement, Eskom remains the primary coal-generated electricity producer and supplier nationally. Further, the government’s appetite for coal is demonstrated by its open policy support for continued, and expanding, private sector investment in coal mining (as outlined in the Integrated Resource Plan of 2019). Some of the major South African banks are pouring millions of the local currency into new coal-mining ventures, fully supported by and in line with government policy. The grim outcome of this coal obsession is continued high GHG emissions, thus deepening of climate hazards and shocks directly affecting the poor and vulnerable. This reality means the probability of South Africa genuinely pursuing mitigation (through emission reductions) as one of the actions towards climate justice is, at the moment, patently impractical.
The lack of the South African government’s urgency in pursuing mitigation actions for climate justice is also visible in its lethargic approach towards clean renewable energy generation. Despite the existence of the Integrated Resource Plan (2019) and the Just Transition Framework (2022) both of which have provisions for a gradual transition to solar, biomass, wind and small hydro energy generation, the pace of this shift is still negligible. Evidence of this abounds: while the government’s efforts through the Renewable Independent Power Producer Programme (REIPPP), a private sector energy security investment initiative, is beginning to add some megawatts (MW) into the national electricity system, this is hardly a fraction of the 6,000 MW generation capacity awarded to successful bidders of the REIPPP (Government of South Africa 2023). This means the REIPPP, regardless of all the green credentials hype around it, remains an abject initiative without the capacity to produce adequate clean energy thus partly contributing to the failing mitigation agenda.
On the adaptation front, there is some progress in mainstreaming the NCCRS (2004), National Climate Change Response White Paper (2011), National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (2019) and elements of the Just Transition Framework (2022) into provincial and local integrated development programmes. Some provincial governments (e.g., Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal, etc.) and their local governments have developed and are implementing adaptation and resilience-building activities at the grassroots level. These include subsistence climate-resilient agriculture, biodiversity and ecosystems conservation, rehabilitation of wetlands, urban resilience building, urban infrastructure climate proofng, climate information sharing and climate services, etc. (Moyo 2017; Pillay and Pillay 2018). However, these are few and fragmented, thus limiting their overall impact in transforming the livelihoods of the poor and vulnerable. For example, in the Eastern Cape Province, Buffalo City’s early systems warning network is poorly coordinated, hence compounding the chaotic disaster management response to recurrent climate-induced fooding in poor working-class townships. Lack of infrastructure climate proofng in these townships also means homes, roads, schools and health facilities are destroyed as and when regular fooding occurs, thus depriving the poor and vulnerable enjoyment of basic rights associated with this infrastructure.
One of the ways South Africa could potentially achieve distributive and procedural justice for the poor and marginalized, in line with its climate action strategies, is through increasing its adaptation fnance purse and broadening its portfolio. In simple terms, adaptation fnance "specifcally targets development that reduces climate risk thereby realising climate resilience objectives" (Pillay et al. 2017:11). Notwithstanding that raising climate fnance is diffcult under the current harsh economic times in a country with lingering apartheid and colonial legacies, the fact is South Africa is simply not aggressive enough in fnding these fnancial resources in public and private revenue sources. One of the reasons for this is the governments’ approach that narrowly conceives climate fnance as strictly for climate activities instead of seeing it as cross-cutting funding that simultaneously addresses other human development needs in conjunction with resilience building. This calls for the government to broaden its climate fnance conception such that, for example, urban infrastructure development or rehabilitation embeds climate proofng, enhances sustainable urban living alongside strengthening resilience. For this to happen, a more dynamic and multifaceted fund-raising approach is required in order to increase the climate fnance budget from its current mediocre levels. Without adequate climate fnancing, many adaptation and resilience activities of the poor and marginalized, whether self-initiated or not, will remain negligible and of limited impact, thus limiting their chances of enjoying basic socioeconomic rights under the ongoing climate crisis.