For more than 40 years the people of South Sudan endured cycles of civil war until they gained independence from Sudan in 2011 (Afriyie et al. 2020: 33). However, the country had barely gained independence before a war broke out in December 2013 between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) faction, allied to President Salva Kiir, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in-Opposition (SPLA-IO), allied to Riek Machar, the then-vice president.
This chapter argues that for a cyclic confict of the magnitude experienced in South Sudan to effectively terminate, the negotiation process should ensure that two elements are built into the negotiation process, and subsequently into ensuing peace agreement(s). First is the need for the parties to mutually identify and agree on terms of peace (under which the confict is to end). This means that negotiations should go beyond the (often narrow) political interests of the main protagonists. Parties to peace negotiations should retrospectively refect on the root causes of the confict, and not just the power-sharing interests of the leaders of the day. In an opinion piece to the parties in the confict between Ethiopia’s government and the semi-autonomous region of Tigray that broke out in late 2020, Gavin (2021: 1) advises that a way for ward would require cooperation at the international level, careful diplomacy, and "an inclusive political process that restores confdence among the coun try’s diverse population." This is the same spirit the parties in the confict in South Sudan would have to embrace, in a "give-and-take" approach.
Second, because of the atrocities and human rights violations committed during armed confict, issues of justice and reconciliation should not be swept under the rug. It is therefore paramount that past and present human rights abuses by both or all parties involved in the confict be discussed frankly and agreeable mechanisms be identifed to deal with the violations. However, the underlying approach should drive towards narrowing differences and not reopening wounds for revenge and relapse of the situation.
This is based on the realisation that no meaningful post-confict processes can move forward if a peace agreement does not weather the vagaries of post-confict violence across all sectors of society. For instance, Scharf and Williams (2003) and Ginn (2005) emphasise the importance of complying with the demands of justice in post-confict armed violence environments as a prerequisite to peace and stability. Ginn underscores Scharf and William’s view by stating,
As more and more countries undergo the trauma of civil war or revolutions against repressive regimes, they and the international community must confront the problems of transforming these situations of violent confict into healthy, functional democratic states. The guiding principle behind post-confict or transitional justice is that complying with the demands of justice is a necessary prerequisite to peace and stability…
He goes further to differentiate between post-confict justice and transitional justice by echoing Bassiouni (1997) when pointing out that the term "post confict justice" grew out of the Nuremberg trials (with its roots as early as the Treaty of Versailles). The term initially focused on retributive justice through judicial mechanisms. The objective was to punish offenders with a view to preventing the recurrence of conficts. On the other hand, transitional justice emerged in the 1980s in situations where the confict had not yet been resolved. Instead of focusing on individual perpetrators, it shifted attention to broader social issues relating to the need for reconciliation and social reconstruction.