Whereas it is true that today’s wars have evolved in comparison to classical or ancient wars, several lessons that may be relevant to South Sudan’s civil wars can be drawn from the way classical wars ended without signifcantly negatively impacting civilians. One of the classical strategic military theories put forward by classical strategic military theorist Clausewitz follows the teachings of Machiavelli and Sun Tzu, and emphasises the parties to a war reaching agreeable terms of peace.
Classical theory recognises that a war can only end in two ways: outright victory or negotiation. According to classical theorists, whichever way it ends, the most important factor is the transformation of tactical victory (or victory on the battlefeld) into strategic peace (or long-term peace). Clausewitz states that the way to strategic peace is when a tactically victorious party displays magnanimity by offering to negotiate with the vanquished the terms that could guarantee both parties long-term peace.
It is only when the two parties reach this agreement that a sustainable, peaceful co-existence is attained. It is for this reason that classical military theory cautions that tactical victory that is not transformed into strategic victory is only a tepid end to a war. Merely defeating the enemy’s army and occupying his country does not necessarily result in long-term peace if the victor does not present to the loser acceptable terms of peace. The war would surely recur. As such, Clausewitz (1976: 386) maintains that the defeat of an enemy’s army and the occupation of his country only propels the enemy to the negotiation table in search of strategic (long-term) peace. Therefore, the victor ought to seize that moment and use it to their advantage to end the war sustainably.
In his advice on how the victor should treat the vanquished, Machiavelli in Discourses cautions that a victor who fails to transform tactical victory into strategic peace faces a rejection by the vanquished. The Romans asked their vanquished what kind of punishment should be meted out to them. To this end, the Romans posed, "and if we should remit the penalty to you, what sort of peace could we hope to have with you?" The vanquished responded, "if you grant a good one, loyal and lasting; if a bad one, not very long …" (Machiavelli 1965: 390–395). This, in classical military theory, points to the essence of negotiating with the vanquished the terms of peace that would be acceptable to them so that they do not stage a revolt against the victor. It showcases the magnanimity of the victor in victory. Machiavelli captures this when he writes,
The people of that town sent many citizens to ask pardon from the Senate … When one of the Senators asked one of them what punishment he thought the Privernati deserved … the man answered: "That which they deserve who think themselves worthy of liberty." To this the Consul replied: "And if we should remit the penalty to you, what sort of peace could we hope to have with you?" To which he replied: "If you grant a good one, loyal and lasting; if a bad one, not very long …"
In the same vein, Thucydides, like Machiavelli, extols the virtues of magna nimity in victory and goodwill in peace by drawing from the Athenian wars. He advises that if great enmities are ever to be really settled,
we think it will be, not by the system of revenge and military success, and by forcing an opponent to swear to a treaty to his disadvantage, but when the more fortunate combatant waives his privileges, to be guided by gentler feelings, conquers his rival in generosity, and accords peace on more moderate conditions than he expected. From that moment, instead of the debt of revenge which violence must entail, his adversary owes a debt of generosity to be paid in kind and is inclined by honour to stand to his agreement.
Classical theorists therefore object to the annihilation of the vanquished by the victor. Rather, they recommend mutually negotiated terms that would govern peace between them. This is the essence of negotiating the terms of peace as a guarantee of strategic peace. It is this process that transforms tactical victory into strategic victory.
Based on the foregoing refections on how to achieve strategic peace, this section reviews the negotiation process, parties involved and the contents of the resulting peace agreements between 2013 and 2018 when the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Confict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) that brought back Riek Machar as vice president was fnally reached. A brief review of the events leading to the December 2013 outbreak of confict indicates that there were all signs beforehand that unresolved past issues would lead to intra-South-Sudanese confict. Johnson (2014a: 300–309) points out that the 2013 political and military crisis was a power struggle enacted through factional fghting within the then Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the ruling party.
Although this chapter focuses on issues relating to the civil war that erupted in December 2013, the structural nature of the confict and its linkages to the over 40-year confict that South Sudan has experienced dictates that we provide a short review of the immediate past occurrences to situate this discourse. That a war broke out between South Sudan’s independent political actors just two years after independence is indicative of pre-existing underlying challenges that were not prioritised.
Classical strategic military theorists state that war is a continuation of politics by other means. Clausewitz goes further to say that war is a clash between major (political) interests that is resolved by bloodshed (Clausewitz 1943: 144), adding that "Politics … is the womb in which war develops …" This was also the position of war strategists Mao and Sun Tzu, who maintained that there has never been a war that did not have a political character, and that war cannot even for a single moment be separated from politics (Handel 2004: 65). This denotes the primacy of politics in war. In this case, there are two main actors. On the one hand is the politician who defnes the political objective (goal) that their government want to pursue, an, on the other hand, are military commanders to execute the political objective by going to war against a rival military.
Clausewitz (in Handel 2004: xviii–xix) identifes six basic elements emanating from classical military theory that should guide the formulation of the political objectives of a war. Among the six are that military victory alone is not enough, as, for such a victory to be sustainable, the military achievements must be consolidated by political and diplomatic means: the victory achieved must be made acceptable to the enemy. Secondly, wars cannot be abolished, as confict and violence are part and parcel of the relationships between nations and groups. Some wars can, however, be prevented.
Equally important to classical theorists of war is the duration and cost of war. They assert that a war should be won quickly and with the lowest possible cost. This happens when the political objective is well defned and the strategies clear. When political objectives are not clear and strategies not suitable, a war may become one of attrition, a long one, or a series of wars, which eventually erodes the will and resources of the agitators without a decisive offensive from either side. According to Alan and Murray (quoted in Tuck, 2010: 123), mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but political and strategic mistakes live forever.