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Censorship, in its broad meaning, refers to all forms of restrictions and control practised by individuals, societies and authorities on freedom of expression and its relation to notions of respect and decency, among other things. Thus, it varies according to social and political contexts that determine the general taste of the public, as well as what can be permitted, circulated, forbidden, repressed or outlawed. There is always an inverse relationship between censorship and a political system. The more democratic a society is, the less censorship is practised and vice versa. The focus of this chapter is on censorship in North Africa, with a special emphasis on social media censorship in Egypt and Morocco.
Generally, there is an ongoing debate over freedom of social media, especially after the rise of the Arab Spring. On the one hand, the ready availability, though belated, of social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp in North Africa enabled people not only to receive but also to actively participate in decision-making. In many African countries, there is currently an unprecedented boom in Internet usage in the words of Warf and Vincent: "the largest numbers were to be found in Egypt, by far the most populous Arab country, which had 5 million users, Morocco (4.6 million)" (Warf and Vincent 2007, 84). Compared to the radio, television and newspapers, the Internet is totally open, "interactive and limitless, with no built-in control". For the public, the Internet makes it possible for anyone to publish their thoughts, views and accounts freely. They can also control their audience, those who can read their personal reports. They can share public debates individually or in interest groups or on a wider scale. In a word, being both low in cost and easy to use, the Internet makes the world a global village, promotes social, political and economic development. In addition, it allows access to multiple sources of information, textual, visual and audible. More importantly, the Internet creates an unprecedented growth in awareness of foreign ideas and political norms.
On the other hand, the Internet has many undesirable impacts. For exam ple, it can incite radicalisation by equipping both activists and terrorists with a low-cost, readily accessible tool to call for protest against government structures. It can also arm them with a free medium of information exchange where they can arrange meetings, collaborate, share protest tactics, communicate with followers and participate in joint recruits. Such extensive discussions of these subjects on social media appeal to extremist groups who always take the chance to make their voices heard around the globe by spreading public debate on issues concerning poor governance, social justice, state corruption and unemployment among liberal-minded, secular youth.
The Arab Spring, for example, has been broadly presented as a "Facebook revolution" in Egypt and "YouTube Uprising" in Syria, magnifying the size of the social and political effects of social media and glossing over "the sheer material and moral force of millions of Egyptians and Syrians who took to the streets, risking injury, disability, or death, to fight for self-determination, basic human rights, dignity, and freedom". In Egypt, as Khamis states: "Facebook revolution" began with the case of Khaled Said, the young, middle-class Egyptian youth who was beaten to death by two police officers after allegedly uploading a video to YouTube revealing police corruption. His deformed face became an icon that inspired and enflamed the Egyptian revolt against violations of human rights, emergency law, autocracy and corruption (Khamis et al. 2012).
In turn, governments try to counter the political activists’ efforts, whether via traditional, state-owned media avenues, or new media tools. Governments begin to take serious actions towards the way that information posted on social media is reported, analysed and acted upon. They see the Internet as a threat and thus they impose different censorship measures to control internet content on the grounds of protecting their citizens from the negative effects of the Internet such as misinformation, hate speech or internet crimes. "Governments all over the world use various means – legal, political, technical, and coercive – to control and restrict Internet content" (Subramanian 2011, 69). Hacking websites, slowing down or shutting down internet connection are most common tactics of governmental control over the use of the Internet in many African countries like Egypt, Morocco, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi and Rwanda. During Egypt’s 2011 revolution, for example, the government cut off all internet communications to subside the revolution (Selaiha 2013, 30). Recently, in Sudan, during 219 Khartoum protests, the government blocked social media and disabled access to the Internet nationwide twice: "Bashir blocked the internet – or rather, social media, the part of the internet that dictators believe ‘start’ revolutions… it was nearly impossible to access Twitter, Facebook, or WhatsApp unless you had a Virtual Private Network (VPN). The block was described around the world as an internet ‘blackout’" (Moore 2020).
Before the "Facebook revolution" in 2011, Egypt was regarded as a moderate censor or, to some extent, lenient with internet regulation. It remained so for a long period mainly to "encourage tourism and court foreign investors". Gradually, it became one of the strictest Arab countries regarding internet freedom. In 2004, for example, it created "the Department to Combat Crimes of Computers and Internet, to censor subversive Internet sites, and has arrested programmers, journalists, and human rights activists for violating censorship standards" (Warf 2010, 14). Since then, Egypt has been under the watchful gaze of dictatorship. In 2011, it had one of the most extensive surveillance networks targeted at opposition groups, activists, human rights organisations, bloggers and journalists. Three cases are mentioned as examples. The first case began in May 2017 when the government blocked about 496 websites of news outlets, blogs, human rights organisations and tools such as VPNs used to bypass the blocks. Then in 2019, a series of cyberat tacks were launched against journalists, academics, lawyers, opposition politicians and human rights activists who were condemned and then arrested by Egyptian authorities. Lastly, in March 2019, the "Supreme Media Regulatory Council released a new directive that allows it to block websites and accounts for ‘fake news’ and impose fines of up to $14,400 without the need to obtain a court order" (Paul 2020).
Like Egypt, Morocco used to enjoy less censorship at early periods due to the Article 25 of its 2011 Constitution, which "supports the freedom of thought, opinion, and expression in all their forms. It also guarantees the freedom of creation, publication and presentation in literary and artistic matters, and of scientific and technical research". However, the government blocks access to websites promoting independence for the Western Sahara. In 2018 as a result of many protests, "the Moroccan government induced an Internet disruption and attempted to muzzle media coverage of the protests. Several journalists and bloggers were also arrested. From 2017 to date, Amnesty International reported ongoing targeted spyware attacks with the use of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware by the Moroccan government against human rights defenders" (Paul 2020).