Our fndings highlight that youth movements and the opportunities they ofer young people to exercise voice and agency in the political sphere are transformed through interactions with formal political processes and institutions. During confict, a common objective – bringing about regime change – can provide the impetus for collective action and open up spaces for participation for young people that are not regularly aforded. This was the case with the Qeerroo movement’s mass protests against the then ruling EPRDF regime that had overseen the exclusion and political repression of ethnic Oromo. The relative infuence of the Qeerroo was enhanced by the key contribution the youth had made in defending their communities during the Oromo-Somali regional confict in which approximately 700,000 people were forcibly displaced. It is important to highlight that the Qeerroo movement illustrates that youth are not always mobilised around issues that are specifc to them (such as unemployment or distress migration) but can be mobilised to support causes that do not necessarily prioritise their best interests – that is, the machinations of political elites premised on ethnic nationalism. The interviews with adolescents in this study clearly refected a discourse centred around a conviction in progress and political transformation based not on the emergence of a fairer political system but rather one linked to ethnic identity and allegiances – i.e. because political power is now held by people of Oromo origin.
The longitudinal dimension of these fndings also underscores that these types of youth movements may have a fnite political window. During and immediately after the confict, the Qeerroo played a positive role in terms of community development, especially in supporting internally displaced people living in local host communities and in tackling cultural practices (such as shegoye) deemed to threaten young people’s educational and economic trajectories. However, in the absence of strong and well-coordinated local leadership and with uneven responses to community (and especially youth) needs, the movement’s strength began to wane. This was exacerbated by its focus on ethnic nationalism, which meant that as national-level politics confronted new challenges – especially the confict in the north between Amhara region and the TPLF starting in late 2020 – the movement struggled to fnd common cause with youth in other parts of the country.
It is also important to refect critically on the extent to which youth movements provide opportunities not only for adolescent boys and young men but also for adolescent girls and young women. Our fndings indicate that in the case of the Qeerroo, powerful discriminatory gender norms meant that girls and young women only joined in much smaller numbers. Moreover, the groups for female participation (Qarree) were designed with a supportive rather than protagonist role, whereby young women were expected to support male fghters and defer to their agenda.
In sum, our fndings are a reminder that it is important to avoid romanticising youth activism and to consider how such movements relate to wider context-specifc and rapidly evolving political dynamics at particular juncture in time. While there are participation opportunities for young people that can support transformative economic and social change, challenges remain for movements to ensure the sustainability of such opportunities and to mitigate the risk of manipulation and co-optation, and/or diversion into violent counter-politics.
FIGURE 21.1 Oromo boys in their residence area, Ethiopia. © Nathalie Bertrams/GAGE 2023